
BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL**Report To The Honorable
Bennett M. Stewart**COMPLETED
ORIGINALOF THE UNITED STATES

Actions To Improve Parts Of The Military Manpower Mobilization System Are Underway

The Selective Service System's draft working document of January 16, 1980, which recommended postmobilization registration, set out time frame manpower delivery schedules that were predicated upon many unrealistic assumptions. The Selective Service System has recognized these shortcomings in congressional testimony and correspondence. The Department of Defense has no documentation supporting the basis for the manpower delivery requirements levied on the Selective Service System and is developing new delivery requirements. Work has been started to increase the ability of training bases to take in the increased numbers of people during mobilization.

**FPCD-80-58
JULY 22, 1980**

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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-199333

The Honorable Bennett Stewart
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Stewart:

This report is in response to your March 19, 1980, request asking us to do a limited review of the military manpower mobilization system. You asked us to:

- Examine the assumptions upon which the Department of Defense bases its requirements of 650,000 inductees within 180 days.
- Examine the conclusion of the Director, Selective Service System, as stated in his draft report that the System can deliver 100,000 inductees by M+35 days and 650,000 by M+125 days.
- Determine whether the Department of Defense, specifically the Department of the Army, has the training capacity to absorb 100,000 inductees by M+28 days or by M+35 days, and 650,000 inductees by M+125 days.

In May 1979 we issued a report, "Problems in Getting People Into the Active Force After Mobilization" (FPCD-79-40), on parts of the military manpower mobilization system. In response to that report, the Secretary of Defense said that his office and the Department of the Army had begun work on correcting cited deficiencies. Mr. Coleman Conroy of your staff asked us to examine these actions, primarily in the Army, and to assess the Army's progress in solving the problems. These issues are discussed in the appendix which also includes a brief analysis of actions taken, or proposed, to solve problems in the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations since they were a part of our previous study.

Our work was concentrated primarily at the Selective Service System Headquarters, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics), and various staff offices in the Department of the Army. Brief summaries of answers to your questions follow:

- The Department of Defense has no documentation or calculations to support the requirement of 650,000 inductees within 180 days of mobilization. The requirement apparently was the result of informal inquiries by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the services on their training base capacities. However, there again was no documentation of this. Defense is currently performing an indepth requirements computation scheduled to be completed in August 1980. Preliminary indications are that the requirements will exceed the 650,000 total.
- The conclusion of the Director, Selective Service System, concerning postmobilization registration contained in the draft working document is optimistic. To meet the stated time frames, all events and procedures must work as stated. The numbers of possible procedural failures and their critical importance to the process make success highly questionable.
- As stated in our May 1979 report to the Secretary of Defense, Defense did not have the capability to train the 650,000 people who moved into the services after mobilization. The Army's share of the 650,000 is 450,000 people at M+180 days. According to the Army's ongoing analysis through M+90 days, we believe the capacity of the training base is at least 360,000 new soldiers by M+180 days. With additional equipment provided, the Army could increase its capacity to over 600,000 by M+180 days. The Army must also continue to work on improving (1) the capacity of the training bases, (2) the capability of the training personnel, (3) the ability to expand the training force structure, and (4) the availability of equipment on which to train. The Army must also continue to determine and validate its requirements for trained manpower so that demands levied on the Selective Service System can be based on needs and not constrained by limits in the training base capacity.

The Director, Mobilization and Deployment Planning in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) agreed that manpower needs should not be constrained by limits in the training base and believed the total manpower supply already available to the military should be considered first before establishing the final requirements levied on the Selective Service System.

Mobilization Planning Group officials in the Department of the Army also agreed with this report's statements on training base capacity. They said that their analysis of the training base capacity concentrated on the first 90 days after mobilization day because this was the most critical time frame for gearing up operations. If the recommended actions in their analysis are taken, they could handle the flow of 450,000 trainees delivered from the Selective Service System.

The Director, Selective Service System, and other service officials basically agreed that the draft working document plan of January 16, 1980, was overly optimistic and agreed with the findings in this report.


It should be noted that the shortfalls of the draft working document plan, as pointed out in the appendix, are true of the postmobilization registration program. Although not a part of this analysis, we observed that the Selective Service System was making significant strides in preparing for the President's plan calling for revitalization of the Selective Service System and premobilization registration. On July 2, 1980, the President signed the bill transferring funds necessary for the Selective Service System to commence registration of males under the existing law. It appears that registration will begin by the end of July 1980.

In summary, we are encouraged by the progress being made by the Selective Service System, the Department of Defense, and the Department of the Army on the manpower mobilization problems discussed in this report.

The appendix contains more detailed information on these issues and highlights what further work is needed to improve the manpower mobilization system.

We are sending copies of this report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Director, Selective Service System; and the Secretary of Defense.

Sincerely yours,



Comptroller General
of the United States

BASIS FOR 650,000 INDUCTEES REQUIREMENT

Officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics (MRA&L)) could not provide specific documentation which indicated how the October 1977, 650,000 inductees requirement was derived. They told us, however, that they believed it was the then projected training base capacity during full mobilization in the event of the worst possible combat situation with little or no warning time. We were also told that new requirements are being developed and should be available in August 1980.

In establishing manpower requirements, several assumptions have to be made. For example, according to Defense the specific type of war has to be defined, thus leading to estimates of casualties, patients in hospitals, individuals in transit, "no-shows" in the Active and Reserve Forces, and individuals in the delayed entry program. Casualty figures and other estimates should be based on past data, computer simulations, and professional military judgments. Although the validity of the projections deals with uncertainties, the calculations represent a mathematical approach to estimating manpower needs and can be used to project ranges of such needs.

The level of mobilization will also affect the numbers needed. During full mobilization, attempts are made to bring the current Armed Forces up to their wartime authorized strength; whereas total mobilization refers to an expansion of the force structure.

Due to the lack of documentation, we could not determine the extent to which these factors were considered in establishing the 650,000 requirement. However, the numbers appear to be an estimate of what the training bases could have absorbed during the time frames.

The Congressional Research Service pointed out in its issue brief, updated March 28, 1980, entitled "Military Manpower For Mobilization: The Draft, Registration, and Selective Service," that the Department of Defense's inductee requirement was based on estimates of training base capacities.

The Department of Defense should insure that the demands for trained manpower levied on the Selective Service System be based on needs and not constrained by limits in the training base capacity. Requirements for trained manpower change periodically.

If the new requirements result in increased demands for trained manpower, and those demands exceed the Selective Service System's planned capacity, changes will be needed to the Selective Service System's operations. This would be less risky than the current practice.

The Director of the Mobilization and Deployment Planning Directorate in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) agreed that the requirements for manpower levied on the Selective Service System should not be constrained by training base capacity. He believed that in establishing such requirements, consideration should first be given to total manpower supply already available to the military. The remainder of the services' needs for manpower should then become the requirement levied upon Selective Service.

CONCLUSIONS IN SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM'S DRAFT REPORT

In August 1979 we reported on the Selective Service System's Emergency Registration Plan designed to meet Defense's manpower delivery requirements. This plan placed heavy reliance on the States' election machinery (polling places) for conducting postmobilization registration. We pointed out several weaknesses in the plan and concluded that it was doubtful that it ever could be implemented. We recommended peacetime registration as the least risk to the Nation in meeting Defense's manpower delivery requirements. Subsequently, the House defeated a measure by the House Armed Services Committee to begin standby draft registration, but required the President to submit a plan to the Congress to include recommendations on the desirability and feasibility of resuming peacetime registration. On February 11, 1980, the President submitted his report to the Congress recommending face-to-face draft registration for men and women. On July 2, 1980, the President signed the bill transferring funds necessary for the Selective Service System to commence registration of males under the existing law. It appears that registration will begin by the end of July 1980.

Before the President's February 11, 1980, decision, the Selective Service System had prepared a draft working document (Jan. 16, 1980) in which five options for upgrading its emergency capabilities were considered. The postal service became a key component in the registration process rather than the State election machinery. The option recommended by the System called for a postmobilization registration which set out the following time frame delivery capabilities:

Days

- M-day to M+4 - register 4 million persons at postal service facilities
- M+5 to M+6 - sort, keypunch, and transmit data to Selective Service System's central computer
- M+7 - issue first induction notices
- M+8 to 17 - inductees report to Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES)
- M+18 - first inductees report to training base
- M+34 - will have processed 100,000 inductees
- M+124 - will have processed 650,000 inductees

The System planned to use offices and employees of the (1) U.S. Postal Service to carry out the registration, (2) Social Security Administration and/or Internal Revenue Service for key punching and data transmission purposes, and (3) Defense's recruiting commands to reactivate area offices. The System would also use a network of highly automated data processing equipment to conduct the registration.

To accomplish the setout time frames, the System would have had to take numerous actions before and after mobilization day. These include such things as prepositioning supplies and equipment; recruiting and training local and appeal board members; arranging for delivery of induction notices; making formal agreements with other agencies for the use of their equipment, facilities, and employees; training other agency personnel to the System's procedures and requirements; and testing the equipment and computer systems to be used to insure accomplishment of projected workloads.

The January 16, 1980, document as drafted by the Selective Service System was optimistic. Many assumptions were made about its feasibility and delivery capabilities. The number of possible procedural failures make it highly probable that the postmobilization plan would not work as written. For example, we found that:

- Although written memorandums of understanding had been entered into with the U.S. Postal Service, Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, Department of Defense, and other agencies to

conduct the specific responsibilities set forth in the plan, many of the procedures had not been tested to insure that specific time frames would be met. Several System officials said they believed the established time frames were overly optimistic because many parts of the plan had not been tested.

- No formal written arrangements had been made with Western Union to process and transmit induction notices, and the System did not know whether the quantities of induction notices could be processed and delivered within the specified time frames.
- The System had not established a plan for recruiting local and appeal board members. It has a list of former board members, but it has not purged the list since November 1977. As a result, no potential volunteers have been contacted regarding their willingness or physical ability to work. The system had not verified the current addresses of former board members.
- Training of local post office officials is the responsibility of the Postal Service. Training has been given to higher level officials, but not to those at the local level. Also, the Selective Service System has not established procedures requiring verification that local training has occurred.
- The time frames for processing the data do not consider time associated with data correction problems. System officials said they were trying to get a handle on what these time losses would be.
- Provisional State Directors had not been trained on how to accomplish the duties they will perform.
- System officials had not visited potential area offices to determine the adequacy of space or the adequacy or availability of equipment. They plan to visit them in August, and if found inadequate, other arrangements will have to be made.

System officials identified other problems with the postmobilization plan which raised doubts about whether the established time frames could be met. For example, the estimated time frame to notify the target population was based on TV and radio announcements during regularly scheduled news' breaks. System officials said a more formalized media program needed to be established to provide adequate media

coverage to the target population. However, they had no estimates of how long it would take to notify the target population. Also, in a March 3, 1980, letter responding to Congressman Edward P. Boland, Chairman, Subcommittee on The Department of Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies, the Selective Service System Director stated that the projected time frames were not definitive. He said that:

"The analysis presented in the draft report assumed that the system was completely established and that everything in it would work exactly as planned. As you are aware, such a system does not exist today and would take considerable time to establish. Moreover, the timetable was based upon a number of assumptions which need to be reviewed in light of the comments received from other agencies and our experience in recent weeks.

"For example, the January 16th draft timetable assumed that with pre-positioned registration material we could fully activate the Postal Service, distribute registration materials, undertake an effective public information program and get an appropriation through Congress, all in three days. Our best judgment today, after intense work with the USPS is that even under the best of circumstances it would take considerably longer to activate the system.

"Another factor which has come under close examination over the last several months is the movement of completed registration forms from registration sites to data processing centers. In the January 16th draft, we assumed that in less than 24 hours we could sort at least one million registration forms, move the forms from 34,000 local post offices, through 300 regional centers and deliver them to as many as 13 IRS/SSA keypunch facilities. Within 48 hours, we would have to process two million forms. Further consideration of transportation requirements, the possible impact of fuel shortages, and the uncertainty of weather conditions, as well as other external constraints makes a substantial upward revision in these estimates necessary.

"One may ask, since our January 16th estimates were overly optimistic, 'What is your best estimate now?' The experience of working through the detailed plans for this spring's registration, and discovering each day new holes that must be filled, clearly shows the difficulty of being too specific when making such estimates. I do believe that given sufficient resources, and the time necessary to develop our operating procedures, train people and test our plans, we could be able to meet the 1977 DOD requirements with a post-mobilization plan. Our experience since January 16th, however, shows that we could not register in four days, start to issue induction orders in seven, or begin inductions in seventeen days."

System officials also said that the recommended post-mobilization registration plan and arrangements made with other Federal agencies were based on an emergency situation requiring mobilization. If the President would have declared a national emergency which did not require mobilization, the System would have had to make other arrangements for the procurement of area offices, personnel, equipment, furniture, and processing of registrant data. System officials, however, believed that under such condition their required time frame requirements would not be as stringent.

Provisional State Directors are nominated by the respective State Governor and appointed by the Director, Selective Service System. Some directors also serve in the capacity of National Guard State Adjutant Generals. Selective Service System officials told us that they were not certain as to the availability of these Provisional State Directors if an emergency occurred and mobilization was not required. We were told that an attempt is being made to resolve this dilemma.

AFEES CAPACITY

In our May 1979 report entitled "Problems In Getting People Into the Active Force After Mobilization" (FPCD-79-40), we said that AFEES lack plans or guidance from the Military Enlistment Processing Command (MEPCOM) to expand their operations during war or national emergency. There was also a shortage of physicians to handle the mobilization workload and MEPCOM was relying on the services to provide the additional physician needs. We recommended that MEPCOM find a

different source for providing physicians and consider contracting physicians now being used part time.

MEPCOM guidance

In following up on the MEPCOM guidance, we were told that a draft revised mobilization plan had been developed and is being circulated to the services for review and comment. However, we were not provided a copy. We were told that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has now taken the lead in developing the mobilization guidance--a function which had been performed by MEPCOM.

Physician shortage

On March 24, 1980, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) issued a memorandum to the responsible Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force authorizing the preassignment of health professional (including physicians) and administrative personnel to AFEES to meet full mobilization manpower requirements. Sixty-seven Joint Augmentation Units--one for each AFEES--are to be established and operational by January 1, 1981. The units are to be filled by retired personnel. The retiree authorizations for AFEES are shown by occupational specialty and by service in the following chart.

<u>Specialty</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
Physicians	193	96	96	-	385
Psychologists	145	73	73	-	291
Nurses	145	73	73	-	291
Chief dispensary, noncommissioned officers	50	25	25	-	100
Medical technician Laboratory	273	137	137	-	547
specialists	158	78	78	-	314
X-ray specialists	111	56	56	-	223
Administrative personnel	<u>1,551</u>	<u>776</u>	<u>641</u>	<u>405</u>	<u>3,373</u>
Total	<u>2,626</u>	<u>1,314</u>	<u>1,179</u>	<u>405</u>	<u>5,524</u>

The use of retirees for the above purpose could cause unfilled needs elsewhere during mobilization, especially with the Army. The Army currently considers all retirees as mobilization assets to the Active Force and not to AFEES.

Providing such personnel to AFEES could increase the Army's projected needs for trained manpower. The Army should decide how unfilled needs will be met.

TRAINING BASE CAPACITY

In our May 1979 report we said that the Army may be able to expand the training centers' physical capacity to accept inductees, but it may not be able to provide training because the Army does not have:

- The number of training units required either in the active or reserve structure.
- The number of reserve trainers required to fill current reserve training units.
- Reserve trainers skilled in the presentation of one-station unit training.
- Knowledge of training equipment availability.

We concentrated on the Army because it is to receive the greater portion of the mobilization draftee load.

In July 1979 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) responded to the report stating general agreement with the findings. The Assistant Secretary said that as a result of the mobilization exercise, NIFTY NUGGET, conducted in October 1978, the Secretary of Defense established the Mobilization and Deployment Steering Group to oversee the Defense mobilization planning process. A Mobilization and Deployment Planning Directorate was established within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) to provide support for the Steering Group and to develop and manage a Defense mobilization plan. We were also told that Defense was developing procedures to test the services' capabilities to induct and train at mobilization.

The Assistant Secretary stated that the Army had established a mobilization planning group to analyze and evaluate its capacity to rapidly expand its training base at mobilization. As a result, the Army identified actions that could significantly increase its capacity to accept trainees during the first month after mobilization.

We spoke with MRA&L officials in the Mobilization and Deployment Planning Directorate concerning the development of the Defense mobilization plan and test procedures. As of

May 15, 1980, draft Defense mobilization planning guidance had been developed and was being submitted to the Services and Military Enlistment and Processing Command for review and comment. We were told that, after making changes on the basis of comments received, the final plan will go forward for approval and implementation. Further, the plan has to be approved so it can be tested during the mobilization exercise planned for this fall.

We met with the Army's mobilization planning group concerning its evaluation of the training base capacity. In doing its analysis the group assumed that, during full mobilization, the Army would (1) fill currently unmanned training companies, (2) bring training companies into the training bases to begin training under accelerated schedules, (3) train 275 new soldiers per company as opposed to 220 (recognizing there would be some degradation in the quality of the training given), and (4) eliminate cycle breaks between training cycles. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the Army's training capacity under surge conditions.

The Army's Training and Doctrine Command developed its October 1979 Post Mobilization Individual Training and Support Plan (PMITSP) based on the results of the above analysis. Previous PMITSPs were not developed using the surge criteria outlined above; that is, bringing training companies on line faster and training 275 per company. PMITSP reflects the manpower resources needed to accomplish the training mission. Copies are provided to the training centers to be used as guides in evaluating their existing structure as compared to that reflected in PMITSP.

In our May report we pointed out that the Army had a shortage of 345 training companies needed for mobilization as of October 1978. Considering the basis for the October 1979 PMITSP, the shortage was depicted at 287 companies. A 2-year comparison of the shortages by training center appears in the following table.

Army Training Companies
Comparison Between October 1978 and April 1980

Army training center	Center's active structure		Planned reserve augmentation in mobilization		Total		Mobilization structure requirements		Difference short (-) over (+)	
	Oct. 78	Oct. 79	Oct. 78	Oct. 79	Oct. 78	Oct. 79	Oct. 78	Oct. 79	Oct. 78	Oct. 79
Ft. Benning	35	36	62	67	97	103	104	84	-7	+19
Ft. Bliss	9	14	49	49	58	63	81	99	-23	-36
Ft. Bragg	0	0	26	66	26	66	120	71	-94	-5
Ft. Campbell	0	0	0	49	0	49	0	90	0	-41
Ft. Dix	20	27	49	49	69	76	102	128	-33	-52
Ft. Gordon	31	27	49	0	80	27	88	56	-8	-29
Ft. Hood	0	0	89	88	89	88	172	105	-83	-17
Ft. Jackson	40	40	80	80	120	120	76	125	+44	-5
Ft. Knox	42	48	58	58	100	106	109	119	-9	-13
Ft. Lewis	0	0	73	73	73	73	94	96	-21	-23
Ft. McClellan	24	25	0	0	24	25	29	30	-5	-5
Ft. Ord	0	0	41	41	41	41	89	83	-48	-42
Ft. Polk	0	0	80	80	80	80	94	98	-14	-18
Ft. Sill	22	30	0	0	22	30	42	37	-20	-7
Ft. Leonard Wood	36	46	50	50	86	96	110	109	-24	-13
Total	259	293	706	750	965	1,043	1,310	1,330	-345	-287

APPENDIX I

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The next step in the Army's study was to evaluate the existing training structure and equipment on hand to assess its capabilities against mobilization training requirements. This was done by conducting a "War-Immediate Analysis" of each training center. This analysis included identifying constraints to training and what actions could be taken to increase capabilities under surge conditions. For example, it identified the key constraint to (1) infantry training as the shortage of M-16 rifles, (2) armor training as the shortage of M-60 tanks, (3) reconnaissance training as the shortage of M-13 reconnaissance vehicles, and (4) field artillery training as the shortage of howitzers.

Actions which the planning group thought could be accomplished to offset the weaknesses included such things as (1) issuing M-16 rifles for 3 weeks of training rather than for the entire 7-week duration, (2) increasing armor trainee-to-tank ratios from 3 to 1 to 6 to 1, (3) increasing artillery to howitzer ratios from 8 to 1 to 12 to 1, and double shifting howitzer training during a concentrated 3-week period, and (4) concentrating reconnaissance training in a 3-week period and substituting wheeled vehicles for M-113 reconnaissance vehicles.

In addition, the Army intends for training units to use equipment that will become available from units deploying to places where prepositioned equipment is located. We were told that training companies constitute major claimants on these assets, but the actual amount they will receive depends on the distribution planning guidance now being determined by the Army's readiness directorate. As of June 9, 1980, the decision to allocate this equipment had not been made.

The Army agrees that unless actions are taken to insure all the needed training equipment is available at and during mobilization, it will not be possible to train the numbers of new soldiers in the required time frames. In addition to obtaining equipment which is freed up from deploying units, additional equipment needs will have to be purchased.

The planning group analysis shows the training centers now have the capacity to train 83,000 new soldiers by M+30 days and 182,000 by M+90 days. If the additional equipment is provided, the capacity will increase to 133,000 new soldiers by M+30 days and 334,000 by M+90 days.

The Army's study concentrated on the M- to M+90-day time frame because the first 90 days were the most critical in gearing up the training bases. As such, it did not

project capabilities out to 180 days after M-day. The Army believes that, on the basis of the first 90 days, it would at least duplicate its capabilities during the following 3 months. Considering this and needed equipment provided, the Army should be able to train over 600,000 personnel by M+180 days versus about 360,000 without such equipment.

The planning group has analyzed the Army's manpower requirements in a full mobilization, regardless of training base capacity, and they substantially exceed the requirements levied on the Selective Service System by Defense.

The above planning group analysis reflects needs during full mobilization. The Army has not expanded the analysis to determine needs under total mobilization. Under this condition, there would be an expansion of the force structure which would require adding to the training structure to train the required number of personnel. The planning group told us it expects to expand the analysis to include total mobilization training requirements.

In our previous report we also pointed out that reserve training division personnel lacked the skills required to conduct one-station unit training. The Army is still in the process of requalifying its trainers to perform this mission.

We pointed out also, that the lack of sufficient training companies was compounded by the reserve training structure being staffed as of June 30, 1978, at 86 percent of authorized personnel. We had reported that "no-shows" and reporting delays could cause increased problems at mobilization, Defense was planning for a 95-percent report rate for its reservists, and current Defense planning called for drawing qualified trainees from its Retired Reserve pools to augment the personnel shortage problem. As of March 31, 1980, the reserve training structure remains at 86 percent of authorized level.

The Retired Reservists have neither been notified of their potential use during mobilization nor preassigned. The Army has not identified the type of training the individual is qualified to do or the amount of retraining necessary to become a qualified trainer. The Army should do so.

For comparison purposes, the following chart depicts reserve training division strength levels as of June 1978 (in previous report) to strength levels as of March 1980.

Reserve Training Divisions Strength
Comparison Between June 1978 and March 1980

<u>Mobilization training center</u>	<u>Reserve training division</u>		<u>Authorized strength</u>		<u>Assigned strength</u>		<u>Percent authorized</u>	
	<u>June 78</u>	<u>Mar. 80</u>	<u>June 78</u>	<u>Mar. 80</u>	<u>June 78</u>	<u>Mar. 80</u>	<u>June 78</u>	<u>Mar. 80</u>
Ft. Benning	70th Division	70th Division	3,107	3,125	2,492	2,334	80	75
Ft. Bliss	65th Division	85th Division	2,423	2,435	1,774	1,851	73	76
Ft. Bragg	80th Division	80th Division	2,423	2,630	2,785	2,924	115	111
Ft. Campbell	-	76th Division	-	2,429	-	2,221	-	91
Ft. Dix	78th Division	78th Division	2,423	2,423	1,981	1,681	82	69
Ft. Gordon	76th Division	-	2,423	-	2,176	-	90	-
Ft. Hood	84th Division	84th Division	3,104	3,101	2,226	2,194	72	71
	-	5th Brigade	-	688	-	544	-	79
Ft. Jackson	108th Division	108th Division	3,107	3,155	3,382	3,403	109	108
Ft. Knox	100th Division	100th Division	2,571	2,620	2,447	2,543	95	97
Ft. Lewis	104th Division	104th Division	3,107	3,187	2,456	2,678	79	84
Ft. McClellan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ft. Ord	91st Division	91st Division	2,423	2,396	1,820	1,967	75	82
Ft. Polk	95th Division	95th Division	3,107	3,119	2,431	2,481	78	80
Ft. Sill	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ft. Leonard Wood	98th Division	98th Division	<u>3,090</u>	<u>3,122</u>	<u>2,773</u>	<u>2,890</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>93</u>
Total			<u>33,308</u>	<u>34,430</u>	<u>28,743</u>	<u>29,711</u>	<u>86</u>	<u>86</u>

APPENDIX I

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The 76th Division reports to Ft. Campbell, Kentucky, with 91 percent strength whereas it was previously scheduled to go to Ft. Gordon, Georgia, at 90 percent strength. The other change in assignments was Ft. Hood, Texas, getting the 5th Training Brigade which was at 79 percent strength.

The planning group should be commended for the amount of detailed work performed to date in analyzing the mobilization training base capacity and defining needs to ease or remedy problems which will hamper the flow of inductees into the training bases. Additional factors need to be analyzed for a more detailed and accurate picture of capabilities. This would include such factors as troop housing and facilities and reception station capabilities. The planning group said it had begun to examine these factors during its ongoing analysis.

The mobilization planning group should also build on reports of the Inspector General and Forces Command's or Training Doctrine Command's annual training evaluations on reserve training companies. It should consider such factors as poor attendance at the training and the reliability of estimates for "no-shows," as well as those for availability of people when refining its analysis of training capacities.